This Financial Times article addresses UK government policy toward technology companies and private messaging, with the headline framing a policy shift as reduced regulatory conflict. However, the article is behind a paywall, preventing substantive HRCB evaluation beyond the visible headline and page structure. The domain demonstrates commitment to journalism and accessibility features, which is offset by the structural access barrier that restricts public information access.
It's a little unclear, but my reading of this is that the power to do it will still be in the law, requiring at most secondary legislation to put into effect (perhaps not even that) if they think they ever have enough leverage over messaging providers, or are willing to spend the political capital. Not a great place to be in really, but better than it actually being deployed.
So it seems from the news that it was industry that forced this, but do we know how effective our campaigning and emails to MPs were? Or just some un-noteworthy political cog wheel action?
How could we find out? Do the reasons get leaked unofficially usually?
Why ban e2ee when you could just pass a law giving LEO's the right to passively turn on any mic or camera or look through photos and messages on any smartphone at any time? I mean, how can they keep people safe without that access? Think of the children!
Their purposes have been served. Values have been signalled. Implementation was never going to be possible, which made it all the better a choice, as it means you don't have to actually do anything except blame tech companies when it doesn't happen. Job done.
You see this time and time again, some initiative to "just introduce some backdoors, what could go wrong", and then it takes some time for people who understand what it actually means to convince them that it is in fact a really bad idea and it would be a giant disaster.
So they idiotically put into the law something like "wait for technology to be developed to allow snooping without compromising security"? Such lawmakers shouldn't allowed anywhere near making laws.
> A planned statement to the House of Lords on Wednesday afternoon will mark an eleventh-hour effort by ministers to end a stand-off with tech companies, including WhatsApp, that have threatened to pull their services from the UK
Dear FT, WhatsApp is not a company, the owner of the WhatsApp service is Meta Inc., also the owner of Facebook and Instagram. (It is misleading to citizens that companies can hide behind the names of their acquisitions.)
This is framed wrong: It isn't UK against "Big Tech" it's the UK government against privacy and, to some extent, basic logic. That is, the UK government demanded something that's impossible to deliver, and would have ruined the privacy rights of its own citizens had it been able to force companies to deliver the next closest thing which actually got the government its core demands of the police being able to snoop on everyone's messages.
I don't really like the headline, it makes it sound negative.
Big Tech tends to have negative connotations, nowadays. So, here the FT is trying to say that a democratically elected government is living in fear of private firms.
While it may be true that our government are now living in fear of not just Big Tech but all types of Big whatever, the fight was way beyond just big tech. Sure Big Tech helped but it still is a badly written and badly thought out think-about-the-children type law that was being fought by everyone not just big tech.
I didn't bother to read the article. Headlines are important There are other things to rage about Big Tech, this is not the one.
This article is completely wrong, and almost sabotages the fight against the UK Online Safety Bill, given it claims a victory that simply doesn't exist, and so lures everyone into a false sense of complacency. The UK govt must be ecstatic that they have changed nothing and yet the tech industry seems to believe that they've won something.
All the govt said was "we'll only force scanning when it's "technically feasible" to do so" - i.e. when someone believes the CSAM scanning quality is high enough beyond some given threshold. It's still scanning though, and still fundamentally undermines encryption; it's just potentialy delaying the implementation a bit... having enabled it in law. The thing we should be fighting is enabling it in law.
dang: it's almost worth flagging this thread as being based on entirely incorrect data. For whatever reason, the desire to make progress on this issue means that folks have jumped the gun and are prematurely celebrating a win which is not a win, and thus undermining the whole campaign to protect encryption.
Yeah that was my reading as well. The legislation isn't being changed. The statement even says "We know you can develop [the methods to access], and we still have the authority to order it."
The only relevant part of from op is the govt acknowledging that 2+2 = 4. But it fails to acknowledge that if they want to get 5, they can still order the equation to be 3+2.
"The source of the bill itself, the UK Conservative Party, has a
significant number of its own critics calling it "fundamentally
misdesigned" David Davis said its well-intentioned attempts may
constitute "the biggest accidental curtailment of free speech in
modern history."
(* sadly my other sincere comment has been buried by people who
apparently can't read past the first line)
Not technically feasible is akin to abandonment in government circles.
To revive this, they would have to find an expert to attest that it is technically feasible to have security with a backdoor that government can access, but at the same time is impossible for malicious entities to access.
Ergo, this is technically dead, which is the best form of dead.
> do we know how effective our campaigning and emails to MPs were?
Campaigning to your MP is and always has been a waste of time.
In addition, the "safer" their seat, the more of a waste of space the MP is because they know their constituents would vote for a pig if the right coloured rosette pinned to it.
Most of the time they don't bother replying, and then if they do reply, you get a two-page party political broadcast, followed by a generic paragraph about "how they understand your concern blah blah blah" but never addressing the point at hand.
I’d bet my life we start to see a massive influx of bad press aimed at messaging providers, focusing on how criminals are using their services, over the next few years.
When the general sentiment of the average Dave is ‘encryption === bad’ this BS will rear its head again.
Seems to have been the standard play for governments of this country for decades now.
What's weird about that is how it has leapfrogged law in 'real-life'. Minors aren't prohibited from talking to adults face-to-face, and you don't need to show proof of age before starting a conversation with someone! This new bill would turn the internet from an environment where nothing is age-restricted (in practice, if not in law) to one where everything is^.
^ Again, in practice if not in law: since no service provider could fully identify and restrict all 'adult' material in real-time, they will be effectively unable to serve any interactive content to minors. Only if the penalties for non-compliance were low enough would the largest of companies take that risk.
Can you elaborate? The article is paywalled. In what sense did they “back down” if not by backing down from the legislation that would violate privacy?
They said its technically unfeasible right now. A backdoor key is really not feasible for E2E Encryption. So, that would mean it would only become technically feasible when they ask companies to send over all encrypted packets and break the encryption themselves.
Maybe that's why they want to keep a provision for it in the law, but develop the technology to break (current) public-key encryption schemes themselves?
But then they'll always be chasing, as the world moves to post-quantum encryption and they won't be able to break it anymore. So it'll always remain technically unfeasible.
Its likely that from a political standpoint, it was easier to deem the bill as technically unfeasible now rather than kill it completely.
So excuse what may be my profound ignorance, but aren't there 2 unencrypted points in every communication that they could intercept?
Very roughly, I assume every Whatsapp message follows something along the lines of:
1. Unencrypted input
2. Encryption
3. Encrypted transmission
4. Decryption
5. Unencrypted stream to display handler
Technically - what's to stop them from compelling Apple and Google into putting a software keyboard logger inbetween 1 & 2 and another output logger between 4 & 5?
Edit: I'm not saying this backdoor would be secure btw. Of course it wouldn't. But that seems to me a separate issue than "breaking encryption"
This is a right-wing Tory government. The same people who initiated the Brexit mess mainly because they wanted to opt out of human rights (sorry I mean "reclaim their sovereignty").
Setting my personal opinion on this law proposal aside, I think that the UK legislation lost its teeth with Brexit. It's just loud barking for the sole purpose of getting CEOs on the table.
Imagine their influence if they would have stayed in the EU, and if France would have joined them (which they usually do when it comes to more governmental oversight of the executive branches of the government).
What scares me a little now is that there was a loss of balance, which is important for any democracy to make progress. And if Big Tech's reaction is always "well then we just pull out of your market(s)" then it's gonna be an empty threat after the third time.
I don't know how the reactions to these events will be like, but most likely we'll see an increase of propaganda press statements on "how bad secure messaging" is, trying to push the narrative into a different direction.
You're making it sound as if the headline was poorly written, perhaps by accident or by a poor writer.
I can assure you that isn't the case. Whoever wrote that headline is a copywriting genius. The headline conveys almost the exact opposite of what really happened, without being factually wrong.
lol the uk gov has more negative connotations than bigtech.
Also not quite democratic when the uk electorate last voted for a gov in 2019 but we have had 3 prime ministers since all with vastly different strategies, where the last 2 were chosen by anyone who wants to pay for a membership to the tory party, including fake identities made by journalists who registered from france.
If you had some context, bigtech are actually fighting to keep encryption alive and are the goodies in this story.
Context is important, so is reading. But thanks for your insight in the article you didn't read.
Basically all of the secure messaging platforms have indicated that they will pull out of the UK rather than weaken the security model, if or when they are instructed to. That hasn’t changed either. What this may be politically is a way of the Government saying they won’t actually do it, while pretending that nothing has changed to make it look like it’s not a U-turn and pretending they’re not backing down. Hence their eagerness to pretend nothing is different.
As long as the messaging platforms don’t change their commitment then celebrating a small acknowledgement from the Government that the bill is basically unworkable is not a huge issue.
With the way the law is going the UK could demand that Tech providers provide backdoors into end-to-end encryption.
The providers can refuse.
The UK can then demand that such apps are not available in the UK.
HOWEVER ... the providers can build WASM equivalents that run in the phones browser.
These can be available elsewhere in the world, and there is no way to stop UK residents from installing them.
If there is no other way to have end-to-end encrypted messaging, some provider WILL offer this ... and they'll make it pretty slick.
You can try prosecute each user (not much chance of success).
Legislation that fights well implemented secrecy will always eventually loose, as the government becomes just one more hostile actor, which the tech is already set up to protect against.
If the government pushes too hard, all that happens is that encrypted messaging moves out of app stores into the open internet ... and then, not only can they not see the content, they can barely see who is using it.
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Headline frames government 'pulling back' from tech regulation as a positive development, suggesting editorial support for reduced restrictions on expression and communication
FW Ratio: 50%
Observable Facts
Headline states 'UK pulls back from clash with Big Tech over private messaging'
Page requires paid subscription to access full article content
FT provides language translation to 26 languages and accessibility help features to offset access barriers
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Headline's language ('pulls back') frames policy shift favorably toward freedom and reduced restrictions
Paywall structurally contradicts the right to seek and receive information on freedom-related policy
Multilingual and accessibility features partially mitigate but do not eliminate paywall access barrier
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Article headline references private messaging; substantive content not accessible
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Article headline visible: 'UK pulls back from clash with Big Tech over private messaging'
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Paywall restricts information access on topic directly related to privacy rights
Paywall restricts public access to information about freedom-of-expression policy; subscription model creates access barrier contradicting the right to seek and receive information
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build 6157e1d+ai0o · deployed 2026-02-28 16:55 UTC · evaluated 2026-02-28 16:29:11 UTC
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