Summary Labor Rights & Fair Compensation Advocates
Steve Blank's 2019 opinion piece examines how venture capital's adoption of 'growth capital'—keeping private companies private for 10-12 years instead of 6-8 years—has eliminated stock options as effective employee incentives. While founders receive preferential Restricted Stock Awards and VCs capture the upside of delayed IPOs, regular employees face dilution, expired vesting schedules, and broken promises of wealth creation—violating core labor rights (Article 23), equal treatment (Article 7), and adequate living standards (Article 25). Blank advocates systemic reform: RSAs for early hires and RSUs for all employees to restore the fair deal that historically attracted talent to startup work.
It's bad for most people, but when it's good it's really good.
I was lucky to join a now unicorn as one of the first few dozen employees a few years ago. I forward exercised with a few thousand out of pocket (section 83b) an equity grant now worth around $1.5m. Because I forward exercised my options at a low valuation I didn't have to worry about paying taxes if I exercised at a later time when the company's valuation grew. It also meant that my gains became long-term capital gains, and thus taxed lower, as soon as possible after I vested each month.
- You have little experience and you are using this to break into the industry, and get experience on many different technologies ("wear many hats").
- They are working on a very specific problem or using a specific technology that you strongly desire to work on and it's difficult to do it anywhere else.
- You want to work a certain way (remote, on the beach, whatever) and they are willing to go this route.
Why don't startups offer actual equity grants instead of options? It seemed strange to me when I was starting out in my career that I needed to take a lower salary and options to exercise upon my exit, which wound up costing me thousands of dollars from that lower salary.
Two years later, one founder forced out his two other cofounders, started a new company in the exact same space, and poached his best employees, essentially jettisoning the cap table in the process.
The small frys who exercised their options were totally screwed. That was a real lesson for me on how crazy this stuff can be.
Offer internal Dutch auctions on a regular basis to provide an opportunity for investors/the company/etc to buy stock from employees at a reasonable price. This makes the value of the company, from the point of view of the employee, not "funny money" but something very tangible. With an opportunity to cash out long before it is public.
He glosses over an important point: it's now typical for founders to take money off the table as part of financing rounds, sometimes as early as the A round. Founders will request it as part of a funding round and, there's so much competition to invest in the top startups, that VCs go along with it. Decades ago, this wasn't the case. Founders waited for the IPO like employees.
If you're an engineer sitting on $5m of vested stock in a decacorn, it makes financial sense to sell some of it. Today, companies make that really hard to do.
If employees could easily sell their stock while the startup is still private, this would solve a lot of the problems.
I think an important point was missed: Steve writes:
> The first big idea is that unlike in the 20th century when there were two phases of funding startups–Seed capital and Venture capital–today there is a new, third phase. It’s called Growth capital.
It used to be that The Public would provide the "Growth capital" via an IPO; Now the public is providing, I suppose, post-Growth capital via the IPO. In an current era where the market believes P/E ratios of 24 make sense [1], that has so far been viable.
If more historically normal valuations return to public companies, or if the latest crop of unicorns fail to provide great returns for the IPO investors, I strongly suspect this new division of funding phases will come to an end.
> As Venture Capital emerged as an industry in the mid 1970’s, investors in venture-funded startups began to give stock options to all their employees.
I don't understand this part of the post. When do "investors" grant stock options? When I did a startup back in the 90's the founders owned all the equity the day after the company was incorporated and a stockholder agreement signed specifying what each of us owned. We then sold equity to angel and venture investors by carving out a piece of the common in the former case, and issuing new preferred shares in the latter. Later the company granted ISOs to employees by an act of management, ratified by the board which did of course include investors. But at no time would I have said that the investors "shared their ownership" with employees. All current owners were diluted by the issuance of new shares or rights to new shares, but it was never a flat-out decision by the investors to share what they owned. It was a management decision.
A super trivial and tangental point but Fairchild was funded to make discrete semiconductors -- specifically transistors. In those days they were all assembled by hand! The chip (IC) was invented a year or so later.
It's sad that VC/founder's greed and throwing early employees under the bus became the norm :-( I guess that's a sign of maturity of our field and an indication for bright people to move on to take risks directly, offer their services to companies as legal persons and ignore startups as employers.
IPOs are increasingly turning into an exercise of the Greater Fool Theory [1]. I'm not sure if it's investors or employees who are the bigger fool. Investors can fall back on ratchets [2]. Lyft may sue a bank for helping pre-IPO investors short sell [3]. What does seem to be clear is the widening gap between smart money (investors) and dumb money (employees).
having worked at a lot of startups with various outcomes, I've come to firmaly believe the net preset value of your options is actually correct. If you take all the shares I've ever had options given on, and multiplied them by the strike price, it isn't far off from the ultimate amount of money they've been worth. The variance is high between each one, but taken together..
If you get a 100,000 shares at 0.10 each...they are likely over multiple trials going to be worth around 10K. Act accordingly.
The weird thing is that this state of affairs (a) doesn't save investors very much dilution.
Meanwhile, (b) options do a much poorer job of motivating/recruiting employees, (c) an even worse job of aligning interests and (d) the risk/downsides aren't reduced at all.
If stock "values" start to drop, it can really make a company feel like a sinking ship. That's the risk of equity sharing. They can make bad times worse. This happens no matter how distant/unlikely a liquidity event is.
The solution has been mentioned all over this thread: make them liquid somehow.
Alternatively, stop doing options and do something else instead. Aren't startups supposed to be breaking conventions and being creative?
I agree this Steve B's implication, the average stock option scheme is a vestigial artefact. Unless you're in a position (and of a mind) to negotiate terms, it's a checkbox.
I've never really considered stock options to be a good deal, really. There's a reason they're widely referred to as "wallpaper".
Options are a bit like lottery tickets. All other things being equal, it's marginally better to have them than not, but their existence has never affected my decisions about where to work.
I made a bunch of money from ISOs at large, established companies.
I made zero (well, negative, really) from startup stock options, even before things got really shifty in the 2000s. One startup that I left, that is now a billion dollar company, simply decided to "extinguish" the shares I bought a few years after I resigned. I was probably cheated, but it's not worth the effort to go after them and they know it.
Treat startup options as wastepaper. You might get lucky, but it's really, really unlikely.
I think another correction to the diminishing value of stock options and longer IPO horizon is that insane hours are less common now, even at the peril of the success of the median startup. It's also a result of the tight tech labor market and the wealth divide between new startup comp and FAANG comp. Why should I would disproportionate hours if there's another job with a more certain outcome that does not require this.
Curious if others have seen a drop in hours expected from your average startup (separate discussion if longer hours is a key ingredient and overall a good thing).
Check out the Employee Stock Option Fund (www.esofund.com), we help employees fund the cost of exercise and any taxes. Our funding is on a non-recourse basis so we can help alleviate any risk (especially given the long time to exit that is mentioned here).
I was part of a very well know incubator and a very early employee at a flagship company. Founder blew tons of cash and dilutions but that is part of it and I didn’t mind.
What was ethically shady was shortly after I left with 4yrs vested they decided to restructure the entire company so they could attract investment. They took all the debt from the original company and put that in a shell company that then owned a portion of the new company. Guess where early employees’ stock went? The debt vehicle.
I actually did make some money on the eventual exit, but probably 1 or 2 orders of magnitude off of what it would have been if my stock was in NewCo. Consider the tech we built was a major driver of the acquisition, it was frustrating.
People are greedy, no matter how nice they are to your face.
I joined a company where my offer letter had two salary options: A higher salary with less stock, or a lower salary with higher stock. (It wasn't a very large difference.)
About a year later, we were sold, and the payout from the stock did not justify the salary difference. In order to justify the difference, the payout needed to be about 20x.
When I confronted the CEO she just changed the subject, and didn't understand why I stopped keeping it a secret that I was looking for another job.
The article is right but misses the biggest problem with options: the need to spend money you may never get back in order to have a chance to be paid anything. There are two ways this happens:
- You leave the company after 4 years and have 30-90 days to exercise. The exercise will cost you $20,000. The company is nowhere near an exit. Do you do it?
- When you exercise you are either immediately hit with a tax bill for NSOs or you get screwed on AMT with ISOs. You suddenly owe money to the IRS simply because the company received a very high 409A valuation just before you left. A liquidity event is nowhere in sight.
You've taken a huge gamble by joining a fledgling company that pays little with a low probability of success. You toil for years an overcome tremendous odds to just keep the company alive. But now when you leave the IRS and the company itself wants you to take a final gamble with your hard earned cash.
I used to be an attorney who drafted option agreements. Now I've been at two startups as early employees. The reason why this never comes up is because employees do not know what they are getting themselves into. The options are worth very little BY DESIGN. Unless you are among the first 5 hires, you will have no leverage to negotiate a better deal.
Yes, just like buying a lottery ticket is bad for most people, but when it's good it's really good.
Stock options are never a reason to join a company. They are potentially an added bonus. But they should never be valued in that initial "should I work here?" Not when first taking the job, and not when considering whether you should leave or not (barring an imminent IPO that would delay your leaving by a bearable month or two)
If you go into a casino, put 1000 on green at the roulette table and win, did you get a good deal?
The fact that some people win at startup roulette doesn't mean that it's a good financial decision to join a startup, especially considering that you can make the same sort of money without the risk elsewhere.
Not exactly a unique experience, but my .05 - I started of at a startup with a "lol just do it" attitude to whatever the problem was. Worked 12 hours a day a lot, was stressed out all the time, didn't have a life, got calls at odd hours to deploy...but, if I didn't have that experience, I wouldn't have grown nearly as fast. Got to see all aspects of the products and the consequences of the decisions we made early on. Learned more in a year than in the last 3 at corp/consulting jobs. Then again, maybe it was noob gainz and I made at least a third less than I would have at a corp job.
Not sure if going back to a startup would be nearly as beneficial in terms of "levelling up." Seems like the game now is to grind whiteboard before I get too old for Google.
A friend grew from junior developer to director of IT at that startup, so there's that aspect as well, though I have also seen a number of startups hire leadership outside.
Your story still leaves a lot of room for skepticism. For one, 1.5MM is not actually a very good deal for an engineer in your situation, and likely the company gave you very unfavorable terms. Electing 83b is a fairly irrelevant detail in your story as it only affects taxes, not the outcome of the company.
Your shares are likely going to get hugely diluted exactly because of growth investing like in the article. Investors and founders will essentially trade away your share of the company in new rounds, while they get huge payouts for it, your shares may grow a small amount, again realized over some long time horizon.
Let’s take an extreme example and say your shares double in value (not likely) through the remaining funding rounds, and eventually in another ~7 years you can actually sell them in some liquidity event.
So that’s $3 MM (gross) over 10 years. That works out to be $300,000 / yr in equity compensation.
Certainly very high. But not any kind of crazy number. Definitely there are rank and file engineers in FAANG companies, Wall Street, and other industries getting annual RSUs or bonuses well beyond that without having to wait 10 years to realize it or have the risk that it folds or you get laid off and lose a bunch of future value, and have a high base salary, good benefits, and good work/life balance the whole time.
Given that even a crazy outcome like $3 MM annualized over 10 years isn’t significantly better than other reasonable total comp opportunities, this overall paints a really bad picture for start-ups.
Your case, which is nearly about the best lottery ticket someone could get, is only slightly better than a competitive position at many public companies, finance shops, etc.
Meanwhile, almost all start-up outcomes would be far worse.
> Why don't startups offer actual equity grants instead of options?
Great tax advantages. For ex one startup I worked for did it the other way resulting in recognizable tax income and everyone got hit with a tax bill. Fortunately when it was brought to leadership's attention they were enlightened enough to offset the tax bill with cash but don't expect that, ever.
Share grants would be seen as income by the IRS and most states and taxed at their Fair Market Value. Options on the other hand usually qualify as Incentive Stock Options that aren’t taxed at grant time and “when exercised, it isn't necessary to pay ordinary income tax. Instead, the options are taxed at a capital gains rate.” [1]
Options are better up front because there is no outlay for the employee. They are a hassle down the road. However, if you exercise during a liquidation event your tax liability is probably covered.
Stock is a pain upfront unless granted before the first round of funding or any real revenue when the stock value is very little. They are easier down the road, though.
Just my two cents. HackerNews, please correct any errors in logic or how this stuff works.
I think a bit of perspective is in order. When the bar for comparison is technical principles at FAANG, yes.
If you want to own a house, have paid-for cars, put your kid through school, put away savings, and otherwise be completely comfortable then you can do just fine. That is "wealthy" for a lot of people in this country.
I know someone that delivered food to restaurants. He woke up at 4am, and periodically did double shifts. His work life balance was worse than almost any developer I know. And he had to carry stuff. [That was a bad work/life balance].
Seriously, count you blessing if you're in software now. I have been doing this 20 years and this is the best it's been since before the .com bubble ended.
I have a very similar story: Was on the first 10 employees at a now unicorn, forward exercised with a few thousand dollars, and my shares are also now worth around $1.5m. But unfortunately the company blocked all attempts at selling any shares on secondary markets.
Something you might not be aware of: If you joined the company before they had $50M in assets, your stock would also qualify as QSBS [1], which means you don't have to pay any tax on gains of up to $10 million.
It was mentioned about half-way through the article.
> And finally, in many high valued startups where there are hungry investors, the founders get to sell parts of their vested shares at each round of funding. (At times this opportunity is offered to all employees in a “secondary” offering.) A “secondary” usually (though not always) happens when the startup has achieved significant revenue or traction and is seen as a “leader” in their market space, on the way to an IPO or a major sale.
I'd be very careful with that... there are all sorts of internal/external events that can influence the perceived value of the company and information about them is not evenly distributed. Creating an environment where individuals in some groups can profit from this disparity (or even misinformation) is asking for ugly office politics.
Because you'll be taxed on something that often has no liquidity nor market. The estimated value on your stock may be $5 and you'll get taxed on that but if you were to go sell it you may only be able to fetch a fraction of that on the secondary market (if there is even one for those stocks), possibly not even covering the taxes you have to pay.
Maybe this used to happen earlier, but I only really saw this after the DotCom bust. In my case it was founders/execs issuing themselves new/preferred stock and diluting all their coworkers into oblivion on an exit.
Granted, these were small shops ~30 people and the exits were small ~$100M, but the effects were devastating. Everyone who could quit, did. People for whom an extra few $100k would have been a big deal would throw drinks at founders in a bar. The code became an unmaintainable worthless mess and they basically failed to live up to the value they existed at.
Why would someone give the founders such a deal? If they don't care about their employees to share 10%, they probably don't care about even medium term success.
My problem with it is that there are many scenarios that are fantastic for the founders, but only one (unicorn) that is fantastic for non-founders. You can put in the same long hours, pour your soul into it, take the same risk for years, but if there's an exit event, you'll only be feeding off crumbs while the founders feast on the rewards.
A lot of smaller/early stage/seed startups actually do this. It's a restricted stock grant. And for the people saying they don't do it because of taxation on an illiquid asset, this is why 83(b)'s exist. They let you pay the full tax on a stock grant at time of the grant, not time of vesting.
You get a 409A valuation to establish the Fair Market Value of your stock. That valuation isn't based on the same criteria that investors use, it is much more rigorous and based on income, cash in the bank, etc. You could very well have a company raise money at at $10MM cap and be "worth" less than $1MM. If you grant someone stock at that price, their taxable income will be negligible - usually only a few hundred to a few thousand dollars, and then they don't have a giant tax bill at the end.
You still have to pay capital gains, but that only applies when you sell the stock, so you have the money to pay it.
If early liquidity wasn't an option for founders, this massive pre-ipo/private-ipo market wouldn't exist.
Without early liquidity, a pre-ipo zuck/kalanick/etc. would be a paper billionaire with $0 in the bank and >$1bn "invested" in a risky tech startup. That's not financially or mentally sound, even by their risk lovin standards.
If investors demanded every penny go towards growing the business, those CEOs would just IPO earlier to get liquidity.
It's a necessary alignment of interests, if investors' interest is delaying the IPO.
Employee options holders can't just decide to take a company public, so their interests can stay misaligned.
At some point in my career I discovered - to my horror - that I was learning as much or more new tech at consulting gigs than I did as a salaried employee. Even, I daresay, when I was working at startups.
When I pointed this out to people they didn't believe me. So it turned into a bit of a troll for me to say "yeah I'm going to go consult for a while to build up my skillset" and then watch their eyebrows do gymnastics.
You might assume, as I did, that they hire contractors who already know everything. They hire people with a reasonable skill in a couple areas they don't possess. But to actually contribute you have to drink from the firehose, going deep into the tech you were hired for and the constellation of technologies they use that interact with those things in any way. As soon as you start discovering XY Problems you find they were trying to get you to make X happen because they don't know how to do Y (or didn't know Y was possible) and the clock is ticking.
One problem with this is that later round investors usually want their investment to go into growing the business, instead of paying off employees. So the incentives aren’t aligned here to allow employees to sell their stock while the startup is still private.
Employees are also not usually invited to the investor meetings where these types of negotiations would take place. They would probably need the founders to vouch for them to make this happen.
I would be really curious if someone could shed some light on how a healthy company could simply decide to "extinguish" exercised shares. Like how exactly would they go about doing that, and do you have examples I can read up describing where and how this happened?
I would understand if that happened when the company is in trouble (e.g. valuation dropping below the last preferred valuation, so preferences kick in, or as a result of the company having to honor very high liquidation preferences), but otherwise?
The only couple very shady cases I know about where Facebook with the Brazilian cofounder (with a complicated legal process where they reincorporated the company into a new one or something like that) and Skype with the employees (who naively signed a clawback clause in their agreement stating that the company could repurchase shares in the future at the original grant value even if their price skyrocketed, or something similar).
In all the other cases I know about where employees got screwed, it was because the company saw its valuation plummet and the investors preferences kicked in, in one way or another, so "extinguishing" common shares in that case is "expected" and more similar to a public company declaring bankruptcy and seeing the shareholders being wiped out while the bond holders can generally recoup something, since they have "preferred" terms inherent in the nature of the bonds.
- you won't get lost among the crowd at the big company
- if you join early enough you get to define how work is done, instead of just going with whatever process already exists at the big co
- you will know the CEO personally and have chances to discuss ideas and concerns with them in person, at big co there is zero chance of that
Also, the stability argument is interesting. I've actually experience more stability at the start-ups I've worked at than I have at the big companies. Big companies re-organize often and your manager, manager's manager, etc. might change several times in a single year. Lay-offs happen seemingly willy-nilly for reasons peons will never be told. Start-ups don't have any organization to re-organize, and don't have the people to be continually shifting things around and laying people off.
Big companies have multiple projects running in parallel, waiting to see which one will pan out. If you are working on one that doesn't pan out, it will be cancelled without a second thought (often with lay-offs involved). Start-ups have one project and it better work out or the company dies. It will not be cancelled lightly.
I had a former employer do something different but similar.
They sold all the products to another company, paid all of the proceeds out as a bonus to the execs and big investors, and left the holders of the common stock (ie, employees who had bought their options) with a worthless, empty shell. Thanks for working hard and buying shares in the company!
I imagine that was just a shorthand or maybe he misspoke. It would be a management decision, but they would most likely need to clear it with the investors. Frequently the funding deal between investors and management will even carve out a chunk of equity for incentives.
>Treat startup options as wastepaper. You might get lucky, but it's really, really unlikely.
I have a similar story. I've been a part of three startups (two exited, one still going) and the options in all were only worth an eventual capital loss. For my last company, I owned nearly a percent of shares, but they were still worth zero. The only money I got was a cash bonus and stock from the acquiring company as a retention mechanism (I was an executive of the company, rank and file got much smaller amounts). Startups are good for experience, being a big fish in a small pond, etc. but it's marginally better than a lottery ticket if you're looking for a big financial reward.
It's not impossible for private companies to allow employees to sell stock in funding rounds. Tanium basically follows the recommendations in the article - employees get RSUs, and have been allowed to sell in every recent funding round.
Curious why you don't mention their name? Feels like there's little recourse against this sort of thing other than reputation risk, why not out them publically?
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What the content says
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Article 23Work & Equal Pay
High Advocacy Framing
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This is the core UDHR article for the piece. Article 23 guarantees 'just and favourable conditions of work,' fair compensation, and protection of labor rights. The article comprehensively addresses: (1) Unfavorable work conditions: 'no work-life balance, insane hours, inexperienced management, risk of going out of business'; (2) Unfair compensation: dilution by new funding rounds, 30-50x founder/employee disparity, extended vesting schedules that no longer align with company timelines; (3) Removal of the key labor incentive (stock options) that previously made startups attractive to talent. The author documents systemic violation of Article 23 and advocates for restoration through RSAs and RSUs.
FW Ratio: 60%
Observable Facts
The article lists workplace hardships: 'no work-life balance, insane hours, inexperienced management, risk of going out of business, etc.'
The author documents compensation erosion: 'when IPO's no longer happen within the near time horizon of an employee's tenure, the original rationale of stock options...has disappeared. Now there's little financial reason to stay longer than the initial grant vesting.'
The article explains dilution harm: 'as the company raises more money, the value of your initial stock option grant gets diluted by the new money in.'
Inferences
The author frames startup compensation as a labor rights issue under Article 23, arguing that current structures violate 'just and favourable conditions' principles.
By proposing RSAs and RSUs to restore fair incentives, the author advocates for re-establishing the 'high-commitment/high-performance work system' that depends on fair deal recognition.
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Article 22Social Security
High Advocacy
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The article extensively engages with social security and economic protection. Stock options historically provided the 'security' promised by Article 22—employees' path to financial safety and retirement security. The author documents how growth capital removed this security by extending company timelines beyond employees' tenure, leaving them with no payoff horizon. 'When IPO's no longer happen within the near time horizon of an employee's tenure, the original rationale of stock options...has disappeared.'
FW Ratio: 50%
Observable Facts
The article explains stock options' historical role: 'stock options dangled in front of a potential employee were like offering a lottery ticket in exchange for a lower salary. Startup employees calculated that...someday the stock options they were vesting might make them into millionaires.'
The author documents removal of this security promise: 'when IPO's no longer happen within the near time horizon of an employee's tenure, the original rationale of stock options...has disappeared. Now there's little financial reason to stay longer than the initial grant vesting.'
Inferences
The author frames stock compensation changes as removal of crucial social and economic security protections for vulnerable startup workers.
By documenting the lost 'visible time horizon of a payoff,' the author advocates for restoration of the security promises that Article 22 protects.
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Article 17Property
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The article is fundamentally about property rights—the right of employees to own stakes in companies they build. The author advocates for employees to have equal property rights structures (RSAs/RSUs) as founders, establishing that current inequality means employees are arbitrarily disadvantaged in ownership claims.
FW Ratio: 50%
Observable Facts
The article compares property rights structures: 'founders grant themselves Restricted Stock Awards (RSA)' receiving $0 cost stock with reverse vesting versus 'Early employees...receive common stock options' with traditional vesting and strike prices.
The author recommends concrete action: 'If you're one of the early senior hires, there's no downside of asking for the same Restricted Stock Agreements (RSAs) as the founders.'
Inferences
The author treats startup compensation as a property rights question, advocating for equal ownership structures despite traditional hierarchies.
By recommending employees 'ask for' equal property rights, the author empowers them to exercise ownership claims equivalent to founders.
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Article 25Standard of Living
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The article discusses how stock options historically enabled employees to achieve a higher 'standard of living' through wealth creation, providing security for health, well-being, and family support. The author documents how this path to wealth and security has been closed: stock options are no longer attractive because company timelines have extended beyond typical employee tenure. The author advocates that employees should maintain capacity to achieve Article 25 standard through fair compensation (RSAs/RSUs).
FW Ratio: 50%
Observable Facts
The article explains stock options' historical purpose: 'Startup employees calculated that a) their hard work could change the odds and b) someday the stock options they were vesting might make them into millionaires.'
The author documents closure of this path: extended timelines combined with vesting schedules mean 'there's little financial reason to stay longer than the initial grant vesting.'
Inferences
The author treats stock compensation as the mechanism enabling Article 25 rights (adequate standard of living, security).
By documenting how this mechanism was removed for non-founder employees, the author implies violation of Article 25 protections.
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Article 7Equality Before Law
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The article addresses systematic inequality in contractual/legal treatment. Founders receive Restricted Stock Awards (RSAs with reverse vesting) while employees receive common stock options with traditional vesting. VCs hold preferred stock. The author frames this as placing employees 'at the bottom of the stock preference pile,' violating Article 7's guarantee of equal protection under law.
FW Ratio: 50%
Observable Facts
The article states: 'Rather, when a startup first forms, the founders grant themselves Restricted Stock Awards (RSA) instead of common stock options' while employees receive common options.
The author notes: 'you're now are at the bottom of the stock preference pile. The founders have preferential stock treatment and the VC have preferred stock.'
Inferences
The author advocates for legal/contractual equality by exposing how founders and VCs structured preferential treatment.
The detailed comparison of stock types frames this as a deliberate unequal legal framework that violates Article 7 protections.
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Article 1Freedom, Equality, Brotherhood
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The article directly critiques inequality in startup compensation: 'founders own 30-50 times more than a startup's early employees' despite equal risk and effort. This addresses Article 1's principle that all humans should have equal rights and dignity. The author documents systematic inequality and advocates for reform.
FW Ratio: 50%
Observable Facts
The article states: 'founders own 30-50 times more than a startup's early employees' while 'Early employees take an equal risk that the company will crater, and they often work equally as hard.'
The author compares this to CEO/worker pay disparities, treating founder/employee disparity as an equality and dignity violation.
Inferences
The author frames the disparity as fundamentally unfair based on Article 1 principles of equal rights.
By comparing startup founder/employee gaps to CEO/worker ratios, the author signals this is a systemic equality problem, not merely a market outcome.
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PreamblePreamble
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The article engages with human dignity and respect in labor relations, arguing that fair stock compensation structures reflect respect for workers' contributions. The author frames the removal of stock option incentives as a violation of the social contract that once embodied mutual respect and shared prosperity.
FW Ratio: 50%
Observable Facts
The article discusses stock options as a mechanism that created 'we're all in it together' culture, implying equal dignity between founders and employees.
The author explicitly states VCs 'have intentionally changed the ~50-year-old social contract with startup employees,' treating this as a violation of mutual respect.
Inferences
The author frames fair compensation as a dignity issue—workers deserve treatment equivalent to founders regardless of formal hierarchy.
By invoking the 'social contract' concept, the author appeals to fundamental principles of mutual respect and shared humanity (preamble values).
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Article 19Freedom of Expression
Medium Advocacy
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The article itself is an exercise of free expression—a critical opinion piece on venture capital practices published without apparent suppression. The author expresses dissent from mainstream VC narratives and publishes detailed critique of investor practices.
FW Ratio: 50%
Observable Facts
The article is published in full without paywalls or editorial filters.
The author critiques VCs directly without editorial modification: 'VCs have intentionally changed the ~50-year old social contract with startup employees' and 'the VC's may have killed the golden goose.'
Inferences
The blog's structural commitment to free publication enables independent critical analysis of economic systems.
The article's unrestricted availability demonstrates structural support for Article 19 rights in economic/labor discourse.
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Article 21Political Participation
Medium Advocacy
Editorial
+0.30
SETL
+0.30
The article calls for systemic policy changes in startup compensation, implicitly advocating for employee participation in decisions affecting employment terms. The author provides recommendations ('What Should Investors Do?', 'What Should Employees Do?') that constitute participation in policy-level decisions.
FW Ratio: 50%
Observable Facts
The article includes explicit sections titled 'What Should Investors Do?' and 'What Should Employees Do?' proposing systemic reforms to compensation structures.
The author frames recommendations as necessary institutional changes: 'VCs need to consider a new stock incentive model – RSA's for the first key hires and then RSU's.'
Inferences
The author advocates for employee participation in renegotiating compensation structures through direct negotiation with investors.
The systemic recommendations signal that employees should have voice in decisions affecting their labor rights.
+0.25
Article 29Duties to Community
Medium Advocacy Framing
Editorial
+0.25
SETL
+0.25
Article 29 addresses community obligations and mutual responsibility for ensuring rights. The article discusses the 'social contract' between VCs/founders and employees, establishing mutual obligations. The author advocates that VCs have violated their obligations by changing compensation structures unilaterally, and frames restoration of fair practices as a community duty.
FW Ratio: 50%
Observable Facts
The article uses 'social contract' language repeatedly: 'VCs have intentionally changed the ~50-year-old social contract with startup employees' and 'This level of commitment depends on whether employees perceive these practices to be fair.'
The author frames VCs' action as breach: 'the VC's may have killed the golden goose' by removing incentives they had created.
Inferences
The author advocates for community obligation—VCs have responsibility to maintain fair treatment of employees as part of the implied social contract.
The critique is that VCs unilaterally abandoned their obligations under the historical social contract between all participants.
+0.20
Article 24Rest & Leisure
Low Advocacy
Editorial
+0.20
SETL
+0.20
The article acknowledges work-life balance deficits briefly ('no work-life balance, insane hours') as known negatives of startup work, but this is not a major focus. Article 24 protects rest and leisure; the author notes this is missing but does not deeply engage with solutions for this particular right.
FW Ratio: 50%
Observable Facts
The article lists as 'known negatives of a startups': 'no work-life balance, insane hours.'
Inferences
The author acknowledges Article 24 violation exists (lack of rest/leisure) but prioritizes compensation issues in solutions.
ND
Article 2Non-Discrimination
Article not engaged. The article does not address discrimination based on protected characteristics (race, gender, religion, national origin, etc.).
ND
Article 3Life, Liberty, Security
Article not engaged.
ND
Article 4No Slavery
Article not engaged.
ND
Article 5No Torture
Article not engaged.
ND
Article 6Legal Personhood
Article not engaged.
ND
Article 8Right to Remedy
Article not engaged.
ND
Article 9No Arbitrary Detention
Article not engaged.
ND
Article 10Fair Hearing
Article not engaged.
ND
Article 11Presumption of Innocence
Article not engaged.
ND
Article 12Privacy
Article not engaged with privacy rights.
ND
Article 13Freedom of Movement
Article not engaged.
ND
Article 14Asylum
Article not engaged.
ND
Article 15Nationality
Article not engaged.
ND
Article 16Marriage & Family
Article not engaged.
ND
Article 18Freedom of Thought
Article not engaged.
ND
Article 20Assembly & Association
Article not engaged.
ND
Article 26Education
Article not engaged.
ND
Article 27Cultural Participation
Article not engaged.
ND
Article 28Social & International Order
Article not engaged.
ND
Article 30No Destruction of Rights
Article not engaged.
Structural Channel
What the site does
+0.20
Article 19Freedom of Expression
Medium Advocacy
Structural
+0.20
Context Modifier
ND
SETL
+0.17
The site is a personal blog that publishes unrestricted independent opinions, including criticism of powerful VC actors. No paywall blocks access to critical analysis. This structural choice supports free expression on labor/economic policy.
0.00
PreamblePreamble
Medium Advocacy Framing
Structural
0.00
Context Modifier
ND
SETL
+0.40
Site structure is neutral; blog platform provides venue for expression but includes standard commercial tracking.
0.00
Article 1Freedom, Equality, Brotherhood
Medium Advocacy
Structural
0.00
Context Modifier
ND
SETL
+0.50
Site structure neutral on equality principles.
0.00
Article 7Equality Before Law
Medium Advocacy Framing
Structural
0.00
Context Modifier
ND
SETL
+0.55
Site structure neutral.
0.00
Article 17Property
High Advocacy
Structural
0.00
Context Modifier
ND
SETL
+0.60
Site structure neutral on property rights.
0.00
Article 21Political Participation
Medium Advocacy
Structural
0.00
Context Modifier
ND
SETL
+0.30
Site structure neutral on political participation.
0.00
Article 22Social Security
High Advocacy
Structural
0.00
Context Modifier
ND
SETL
+0.65
Site structure neutral.
0.00
Article 23Work & Equal Pay
High Advocacy Framing
Structural
0.00
Context Modifier
ND
SETL
+0.75
Site structure neutral.
0.00
Article 24Rest & Leisure
Low Advocacy
Structural
0.00
Context Modifier
ND
SETL
+0.20
Site structure neutral.
0.00
Article 25Standard of Living
Medium Advocacy
Structural
0.00
Context Modifier
ND
SETL
+0.60
Site structure neutral.
0.00
Article 29Duties to Community
Medium Advocacy Framing
Structural
0.00
Context Modifier
ND
SETL
+0.25
Site structure neutral.
ND
Article 2Non-Discrimination
Not applicable.
ND
Article 3Life, Liberty, Security
Not applicable.
ND
Article 4No Slavery
Not applicable.
ND
Article 5No Torture
Not applicable.
ND
Article 6Legal Personhood
Not applicable.
ND
Article 8Right to Remedy
Not applicable.
ND
Article 9No Arbitrary Detention
Not applicable.
ND
Article 10Fair Hearing
Not applicable.
ND
Article 11Presumption of Innocence
Not applicable.
ND
Article 12Privacy
Site uses email collection via Jetpack subscription form; standard WordPress analytics tracking present.
ND
Article 13Freedom of Movement
Not applicable.
ND
Article 14Asylum
Not applicable.
ND
Article 15Nationality
Not applicable.
ND
Article 16Marriage & Family
Not applicable.
ND
Article 18Freedom of Thought
Not applicable.
ND
Article 20Assembly & Association
Not applicable.
ND
Article 26Education
Not applicable.
ND
Article 27Cultural Participation
Not applicable.
ND
Article 28Social & International Order
Not applicable.
ND
Article 30No Destruction of Rights
Not applicable.
Supplementary Signals
How this content communicates, beyond directional lean. Learn more
build 6ae9671+7klc · deployed 2026-02-28 16:24 UTC · evaluated 2026-02-28 16:29:11 UTC
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