This article reports on US Customs and Border Protection's warrantless seizure and 15-year retention of traveler device data, including intimate communications and personal information. The piece strongly advocates for privacy rights, due process protections, and rule of law constraints on government power through detailed documentation of the practice and Senator Wyden's reform proposals. The editorial message is powerfully pro-privacy and anti-overreach, though structural tension exists: Engadget's own reliance on behavioral tracking and ad profiling undermines the credibility of its privacy advocacy.
I'm not sure I missed something, the title says "Americans" but I couldn't find an elaboration on exactly _who_ is subject to these searches. The ACLU [0] seems to contend that, at least, US citizens are not subject to these measures.
Is there any significant effort in progress to combat this practice? I see that EFF has some old articles on the topic but I don't see anything current.
"That's when they can plug in the traveler's phone, tablet or PC to a device that copies their information, ...".
would really like to know which "devices" they are talking about. fkn hard to do a full android backup these days.. this world. im tellin ya.
on another note: lets talk about how one would go about keeping ones privacy intact aka having a party in the capitol.
1. will they be able to get into my cryptrooted pinephone / hdd in those 5 days?
2. if not will this only make them more angry and privacy penetrating?
Seems like real solution are phones that by default provided end-to-end-encryption for cloud backups, no local data “travel modes”, secure wipes, multiple logins, etc. — since trying to get countries to uniformly play by same rules seem highly unlikely.
Honestly, as a non-American this scares me. I am absolutely not at all important and a fairly mediocre programmer as well, I don't store compromising data about anyone, never stole code or company data in my life (and never will), etc., you get it. A normal law-abiding citizen.
I still don't want to get my phone taken on an US airport and returned an hour later with God knows how many viruses that even Apple wouldn't be able to detect on my iPhone.
It's not about having something to hide. It's about not liking it when people poke their noses in your business without you being a criminal. And no I don't think installing backdoors on each device "to catch the criminals more easily" is a solution at all.
1. Any malicious person savvy enough to pull off a crime of interest to the Feds is smart enough to provide a wiped or burner phone to DHS/ICE, and they have to know this. So, what is the point in doing this if not to target law abiding citizens.
2. USGOV has a spotty track record of keeping this information secure. A foreign actor is likely to access this info eventually. As one former government official once joked many years ago - concerning Chinese hacking - "Well, its probably more secure in the CCP's data center, so I wouldn't worry."
This is the problem when a non-technical generation makes the rules and regs. Luddites ought not be permitted to ascend the GS ranks.
This happened to me in 2016 crossing into Canada. Borders agents took my phone for no reason, demand I give them the password to unlock it (otherwise they would seize the phone), took it in the back for 45 min before returning it and letting me enter. I think it’s obvious they took all my data.
So now when I travel I just bring my “travel” phone with no sensitive data on it.
As a thought experiment, what would happen if you wrote your own malicious payload to a burner device and handed that over? What if you warned the border agents that your device would deliver malicious code and they plugged it in anyway?
On my last trip back from Europe in June, when I re-entered the US, US Customs & Border Control didn't ask for my passport. No one did. They did wave a webcam connected to a computer in front of my face, and then a moment later, called out my name and said I could enter. Same with everyone coming through the international border area.
I think that's just as weird a development and worthy of "WTH?" as this topic.
It's a great overview of digital privacy and protection laws in the US, how they came about, and what protections they actually offer. The short answer is "very few" and the long answer is "never ever ever turn over your data short of a court order and even then try to fight it."
Then with Third Party Doctrine, most of the few/limited privacy/warrant rules go out the window.
Even if you are a person who will never in your life end up as any kind of person of interest for the government, handing over data in this way could still be quite dangerous.
Phones will often contain data that can facilitate theft and fraud if ending up in the wrong hands. If they're able to copy everything, including private data from all apps that could be quite bad. For example many countries now use apps to login to online banking, with private keys for the login stored in the app. Will that be copied? Will it ever be found out if one of the 3000 government officials with access to this data sold it on darknet markets?
Maybe some months after your travel you suddenly wake up one day to find all your money transferred from your bank account to some account in Nigeria.
This (and similar issues) is the main reason that I donate a non-trivial (10%) part of my earnings to ACLU (and 2 other) organization.
Our rights and freedoms do not come without struggle. And they sure do not last without somebody constantly defending them. And it’s only bravado to assume that we can stand against the might of federal agents as individuals without dedicated organizations fighting for us.
One thing I learned at Defcon 30 was how to break encryption at rest by just storing the encrypted data and wait for a quantum computer to be developed but storing it for 15 years wouldn’t be long enough (average guess of scientists were 50 years in the future).
It makes the NSAs Utah data center to have other applications like parallel reconstruction.
As a European I find it strange how the article and many comments here seem to focus only on it being US citizen's data being hovered up by the boarder control.
No one's private data should be taken without a legitimate cause, no matter their nationality.
Imagine having a knock on your door because you exchanged a few friendly text messages 15 years ago with someone who is being investigated for a crime committed today.
Citizens are suspects. Tourists are terrorists. Everyone is a potential criminal in the land of the free.
I submitted this the other day but it didn't get any traction: the Protecting Data at the Border Act[0] is a thing, but has barely been touched by the relevant Senate committee since it was introduced nearly a year ago. As expected, it's not perfect: it has some carve-outs, and only applies to US citizens (and maybe permanent residents; I forget the exact definition of "U.S. person"). But it would definitely improve things. Maybe something to bug your Senators about.
This recently happened to me earlier this year. I am a U.S. citizen, coming back to the states from South America. I have not broken any laws nor do I intend to.
I put up a fuss and almost missed my flight, but they took both my laptop and cellphone into a back room with about 5-8 other people on my flight. Made me unlock of course.
Here is the pamphlet they let me take… saved and documented. They take down hardware addresses and more, and would not allow lawyers on the scene or for me to witness their search. Here are all the pages of the pamphlet:
As a tech worker and privacy advocate for all I was rightfully not thrilled. I still need to buy new hardware, I had no idea this was the case as far as data storage and 15 years but figured they probably upload malware and all that fun stuff. Neat. I have been a citizen my whole life.
Reading through the comments now, I am glad I learned a little. If they pull the stunt again I will happily deny and wait however long and just rebook a flight and maybe hire a lawyer. It’s a gross abuse of power.
US CBP and other national border agencies change target priorities from time to time, which is reflected in the questions they ask you.
I recently had a long discussion with CBP about my Canadian passport showing a US birthplace. Under a repealed section of the INA my US nationality lapsed some half a century ago and I suspect a call was made to the Port Manager. Since then my entries have not discussed this point which leads me to suspect their system has been updated.
The current question is your plate number (already displayed by the camera). You need written permission from the vehicle owner to cross the border, even if the owner is family.
Border officers may also have quotas for more thorough examinations.
I remember a lawyer on radio saying that they take "naked" laptops across the border.
Most definitely DO NOT cross ANY border with anything that in the most remote possibility would trigger the interest of customs.
To sanitise a phone or tablet, fill it with dashcam video, encrypt and factory reset. Then set it up with a fresh Google or Apple ID.
Maybe leave your sim card at home.
Having repartitioned a tablet, I discovered that there is a massive amount of hardware data in partitions that most people are totally unaware of.
Of course the official response is what you would expect:
“CBP officials declined, however, to answer questions about how many Americans’ phone records are in the database, how many searches have been run or how long the practice has gone on, saying it has made no additional statistics available “due to law enforcement sensitivities and national security implications.””
I mean, that's great and all, but IIRC this Supreme Court has been instituting a policy of Absolute Immunity related to immigration issues via Egbert v. Boule. If one has absolute immunity, the law simply isn't a concern for federal border security.
From what I understand, the border is a sort of wild west in terms of citizens rights and lack there of. As usual with those seeking power and greed, boundary conditions that are not clearly defined are optimized around for their goals. Where do your rights begin and end as a US citizen? That's ignoring all the giant carve aways in your rights when it comes to reentry.
Much of it's quite silly in the era of technology and current society scales anyways where most the nonsense they could be concerned about being on your personal phone in terms of data can be conducted right inside the border without ever leaving. So the excuses for cloning phones and archiving data outside of another loophole that let's them spy on US citizens are pretty limited. Anything on your phone they could be concerned about can be archived, encrypted, and tucked away somewhere on the internet that's far less tracable. So what information do you really need? Outside of the really stupid criminals (who will eventually learn to be more sophisticated and evade these approaches), what do you expect to catch?
Also, I'm sure the US isn't the only country that does this. So if you travel internationally at all, you're essentially boned when it comes to personal privacy.
They will get a $5 wrench and beat you until you give it up yourself, per XKCD https://xkcd.com/538/
In other words: this isn't a technical challenge, either you comply and give them your private stuff, or you're not going anywhere. Maybe you can con them into giving a 'public' part of the phone and pretending that's all there is, but again, that's social engineering and not a technical challenge.
The elephant in the room in this case is that at a most basic level a State is an entity that maintains a (near) monopoly of violence in a given area. Being a normal law-abiding citizen just means that you are currently functioning in an area where the State's goals somewhat coincide with you living with some degree of freedom and comfort. Or at least they have no current incentive to mess with your life. But the whole system of laws we see as normal is just an abstraction that masks the balance of power which is in itself not that different from gang warfare at a higher scale.
When you are disturbed by having your phone searched, what is happening is that the balance has shifted a bit against your favor, and you subconsciously realize that your position is not as safe as it once was. But it was never truly safe, just stable in a certain point and time. The fact that you are not a criminal is irrelevant, because respecting or not respecting the law is very relative. The mental separation between the criminal and the law-abider is fictional in that both are just on a spectrum of usefulness and loyalty to the State.
>Any malicious person savvy enough to pull off a crime of interest...and they have to know this.
You'd be amazed at how many dumb things smart criminals/people can do. Maintaining proper OpSec is hard. It only takes one mistake to give the LEOs a string to pull to unravel the whole sweater.
Everything else, I tend to feel the same way as you. Just wanted to mention the OpSec part
I just just reading this Bloomberg story about a Chinese spy who was busted. It’s mind boggling how sloppy even state backed malicious agents are at information security.
No because if it's standard, they will ask you to disable travel mode and download all the data. You can say no, but you can't refuse and cross the border.
>>So, what is the point in doing this if not to target law abiding citizens.
It's the old rule known to governments all over the world - there is no such thing as an innocent citizen, there is only a citizen who you haven't investigated enough. Call me cynical but storing ALL of your digital data allows the agencies to basically find something, anything, that will allow them to further blackmail you into complying. Even the most innocent person will have something that can be misconstrued as criminal, from jokes about tax evasion to pictures of your toddler in a pool - threaten going to trial if the person doesn't do X, and most people will comply, not because they aren't innocent, but because the might of the American justice system is such that you really don't want to fuck with it on the receiving end.
> 1. Any malicious person savvy enough to pull off a crime of interest to the Feds is smart enough to provide a wiped or burner phone to DHS/ICE, and they have to know this. So, what is the point in doing this if not to target law abiding citizens.
This isn't even remotely true. See for example the recent Anom honeypot[1]. Criminals do more or less the same things that ordinary citizens do, and often have strictly worse security practices because they believe "ordinary" things are weaker. This makes them great targets for snake oil.
That being said, I agree with (2). It's simply an unnecessary risk to keep this much data around for this long.
I believe there was a defcon talk about this but for the life of me I can't find it. My advice is to epoxy your lightning port closed (or snip the data connection inside the phone) and use wireless charging exclusively.
My guess is it would be like setting up a trap gun and putting a sign on the door warning about it. Still illegal. But I'm a rando on the Internet and a loooooong ways from being any kind of lawyer, and I didn't stay in a Holiday Inn Express last night, either.
> I give them the password to unlock it (otherwise they would seize the phone)
IIRC, I've read they can only hold your phone for 30 days or something like that, then they have to return it to you. They can delay an American citizen, but they can't deny entry.
Ever since then, I travel with a travel phone, make sure my photos are backed up when I cross a border, and shut it down before I go through border control. If they demand a password, I'll put up a little fuss and then let them take it.
If you don't read the 'Accept Me' On most random websites nowadays, most people are just openly giving up access to their devices/data without even knowing it.
At the passport control kiosks, they can just scan your face and give you an exit ticket. It was super quick, and surprising. I was able to skip talking to an immigration agent completely. They can do this because they have photos of me from previous kiosk visits, and because they can restrict the universe of photos they need to check to just those who were on recent flights. I wonder how well it works for twins traveling together or something. For any level of uncertainty, they can just have you go talk to a human instead.
Were you on the illusion that they didn't have your biometric data? Or that they didn't have the passenger list with your name in it? Those two are pretty transparent (and honestly, not a big deal).
One approach would be to upload everything, wipe the phone, then log back in but not connect to iCloud (or Google).
Once you've cleared the border, go to a coffee shop and download over their WiFi. Or not, if you're on a unlimited data plan.
That has the advantage of requiring only one phone but would definitely look like you were hiding something. So your approach of a travel phone is better.
Editorial Channel
What the content says
+0.80
Article 12Privacy
High Advocacy Framing
Editorial
+0.80
SETL
+0.94
CORE article focus: strongly advocates against privacy violations by detailed reporting of warrantless data collection, retention, and access. Cites sensitive information collection (texts, calls, contacts, photos) and 15-year retention.
Observable Facts
Article reports 'If a traveler's phone, tablet or computer ever gets searched at an airport, American border authorities could add data from their device to a massive database that can be accessed by thousands of government officials.'
CBP 'adds information to a database from as many as 10,000 devices every year' and retains data for '15 years.'
Article states CBP collects 'text messages, call logs, contact lists and even photos and other private information' and that '2,700 CBP officers can access the database without a warrant and without having to record the purpose of their search.'
Travelers are not informed of their rights before device searches, per the article's reporting.
Inferences
The article's emphasis on scale (10,000 devices/year), duration (15 years), and breadth of data (intimate communications and photos) frames this as mass surveillance, not targeted law enforcement.
The lack of warrant requirement and absence of access logging create structural conditions for privacy violation without accountability.
The article's structural tension is evident: Engadget advocates for privacy in editorial while relying on behavioral tracking for its advertising revenue, undermining the credibility of the privacy advocacy.
+0.70
PreamblePreamble
High Advocacy Framing
Editorial
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SETL
+0.75
Article centers on government overreach and affirms the rights and dignity of all persons against arbitrary state power
Observable Facts
The article reports that US border officials access and store traveler device data including texts, call logs, contacts, and photos in a searchable database.
Senator Ron Wyden is quoted criticizing the practice as 'tricked into unlocking their phones' and dumping 'Americans' personal data' into a 'central database.'
Inferences
The article's emphasis on government authority exempt from warrant requirements frames this as a violation of fundamental rights protections.
The prominence of Wyden's rights-centered critique positions the article as advocating for human dignity against state overreach.
+0.70
Article 30No Destruction of Rights
Medium Advocacy
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Article explicitly frames the issue as government overreach and calls for preventing warrantless device searches and data retention
Observable Facts
Article quotes Senator Wyden: 'CBP should not dump data obtained through thousands of warrantless phone searches into a central database, retain the data for fifteen years, and allow thousands of DHS employees to search through Americans' personal data whenever they want.'
Article advocates for narrowing searches to 'suspected criminals and security threats instead of allowing indiscriminate rifling through Americans' private records.'
Inferences
The article's central thesis is that current CBP practices abuse government power and must be constrained by focused suspicion requirement and warrant process.
+0.60
Article 7Equality Before Law
Medium Framing
Editorial
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SETL
+0.60
Article explicitly frames border agent exemption from warrant requirements as inequality before law
Observable Facts
Article compares law enforcement warrant requirements to border authorities' exemption, establishing two different legal standards.
CBP officers (2,700-3,000) can access database 'without a warrant and without having to record the purpose of their search.'
Inferences
The comparative framing emphasizes that border travelers receive fewer legal protections than those subject to domestic law enforcement, establishing inequality.
+0.60
Article 11Presumption of Innocence
Medium Framing
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Article criticizes searches of travelers without suspicion, directly engaging presumption of innocence principle
Observable Facts
Senator Wyden is quoted: 'Innocent Americans should not be tricked into unlocking their phones and laptops.'
Article quotes Wyden urging CBP to focus searches on 'suspected criminals and security threats instead of allowing indiscriminate rifling through Americans' private records without suspicion of a crime.'
Inferences
The framing of searches as 'indiscriminate' and applied without 'suspicion of a crime' directly challenges the presumption of innocence, suggesting innocent travelers are treated as suspects.
+0.60
Article 19Freedom of Expression
Medium Framing
Editorial
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SETL
+0.65
Surveillance of communications (texts, calls, contacts) impedes freedom of expression and opinion; article advocates against this interference
Observable Facts
Article details CBP collection of 'text messages, call logs, contact lists and even photos and other private information.'
The database is searchable by thousands of government officials, creating potential for state monitoring of protected communications.
Inferences
Collection of texts, calls, and contacts represents interference with the freedom to communicate and express views without surveillance.
The article's criticism of such surveillance implicitly affirms that freedom of expression requires privacy in communications.
+0.60
Article 28Social & International Order
Medium Advocacy
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Article advocates for rule of law by calling for warrant requirement, establishing that border searches must follow due process constraints like other law enforcement
Observable Facts
Senator Wyden calls for CBP to comply with warrant requirement standard applied to law enforcement in other contexts.
Article emphasizes that 'law enforcement agencies are typically required to secure a warrant' as baseline legal protection.
Inferences
The article's advocacy for warrant requirements represents support for rule of law principle that government power must be constrained by legal procedure.
+0.50
Article 6Legal Personhood
Medium Framing
Editorial
+0.50
SETL
+0.50
Article highlights government's ability to access device contents without warrant requirement, undermining due process recognition
Observable Facts
Article states 'while law enforcement agencies are typically required to secure a warrant if they want to access the contents of a phone or any other electronic device, border authorities are exempted from having to do the same.'
CBP can copy device information without warrant after determining 'reasonable suspicion,' creating a lower threshold than law enforcement in other contexts.
Inferences
Highlighting the exemption frames the practice as a violation of equal due process protections, since border agents have powers denied to regular law enforcement.
+0.50
Article 21Political Participation
Medium Advocacy
Editorial
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Article advocates for transparency and oversight of CBP practices, emphasizing need for public participation in policy decisions about border searches
Observable Facts
Article reports CBP does not require officers to 'record the purpose of their search,' preventing public oversight.
Senator Wyden's letter and the article's attention to the issue represent efforts to bring the practice into public discourse.
Inferences
The article's call for transparency and change represents advocacy for democratic participation in decisions that affect fundamental rights.
+0.40
Article 8Right to Remedy
Medium Advocacy
Editorial
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SETL
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Article advocates for investigation and change to current CBP practices through Senator Wyden's calls for updated procedures
Observable Facts
Senator Wyden 'urged the commissioner to update CBP's practices so that device searches at borders are focused on suspected criminals and security threats.'
Article notes Wyden 'called for an investigation into the CBP's use of commercially available location data to track people's phones without a warrant' two years prior.
Inferences
Article's inclusion of reform proposals (focusing searches on suspects, ending warrantless tracking) advocates for remedial action rather than accepting current practice.
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Article 9No Arbitrary Detention
Medium Framing
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+0.40
Device confiscation for up to five days is presented as a form of arbitrary detention of property used by travelers
Observable Facts
Article explicitly states 'if they refuse to unlock their electronics, authorities could confiscate and keep them for five days.'
Inferences
Framing confiscation as consequence of refusing consent implies the government has authority to detain personal property without judicial oversight, which is arbitrary by design.
+0.40
Article 20Assembly & Association
Low Framing
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+0.40
SETL
+0.40
Surveillance of communications (contact lists, call logs) indirectly affects freedom of peaceful assembly and association by enabling government to track social networks
Observable Facts
CBP collects contact lists and call logs, which reveal social connections and associations.
Inferences
Surveillance of contact and communication records enables government monitoring of who citizens associate with, creating chilling effect on assembly rights.
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Article 13Freedom of Movement
Low Framing
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Border device searches indirectly affect freedom of movement by creating risk that travelers face data seizure, though article does not foreground this concern
Observable Facts
Article focuses on border searches, which apply to travelers entering or exiting the country, affecting the right to move freely.
Inferences
The knowledge that phones will be searched and data collected may deter some travelers from exercising movement freedom, representing an indirect constraint on Article 13 rights.
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Article 17Property
Low Framing
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Device confiscation for up to five days represents temporary property seizure without due process
Observable Facts
Article reports travelers can have devices 'confiscate and keep them for five days' if they refuse to unlock them.
Inferences
The confiscation represents a taking of property without judicial process, implicating Article 17, though the temporary nature (5 days) limits severity.
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Article 3Life, Liberty, Security
Low Framing
Editorial
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+0.20
Device confiscation for up to five days represents a constraint on liberty, though article does not frame this as primary concern
Observable Facts
Article states that if travelers refuse to unlock devices, 'authorities could confiscate and keep them for five days.'
Inferences
Framing confiscation as punitive consequence suggests it constrains traveler liberty, though the article focuses more on privacy than liberty dimensions.
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Article 6Legal Personhood
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Article 9No Arbitrary Detention
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Article 11Presumption of Innocence
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Article 13Freedom of Movement
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Article 28Social & International Order
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Article 30No Destruction of Rights
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Site's ad tracking and behavioral profiling practices undermine the dignity and privacy principles affirmed in editorial
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Article 19Freedom of Expression
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Site's tracking of user behavior and ad-based profiling somewhat undermines the credibility of expression-freedom advocacy
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Article 12Privacy
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Engadget's use of third-party ad tracking and behavioral profiling contradicts the article's advocacy for privacy protection; site's business model requires user surveillance
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Event Timeline
20 events
2026-02-26 12:20
dlq
Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years
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2026-02-26 12:18
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2026-02-26 12:17
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2026-02-26 12:16
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2026-02-26 10:13
dlq
Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years
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2026-02-26 10:12
dlq
Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years
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2026-02-26 10:11
dlq
Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years
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2026-02-26 10:11
dlq
Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years
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2026-02-26 10:11
dlq
Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years
--
2026-02-26 10:10
dlq
Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years
--
2026-02-26 10:10
dlq
Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years
--
2026-02-26 10:10
dlq
Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years
--
2026-02-26 10:09
dlq
Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years
--
2026-02-26 10:08
dlq
Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years
--
2026-02-26 10:07
dlq
Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years
--
2026-02-26 10:06
dlq
Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years
--
2026-02-26 10:05
dlq
Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years
--
2026-02-26 10:03
dlq
Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years
--
2026-02-26 10:03
dlq
Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years
--
2026-02-26 10:03
dlq
Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years